requirements associated with the capabilities necessary to defeat future threats. As a result, since WWII, Army leadership has done a poor job in preparing the force to decisively defeat or even disrupt its foes without a costly and exhaustive effort. The Nine years later, the Army is preparing to -RESET‖ the force following President
Obama's directed draw down in Iraq and the likewise mandated future draw down in
Afghanistan. RESET will involve recapitalization and modernization of equipment and systems. It will also include the restructure of some organizations and changes in the doctrine associated with these organizations. Leaders at all levels must come to a conclusion of what that restructure should look like. Strategic leaders will have to consider guidance from all available sources with interests in the situation and lessons learned from the past as well as recent lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They will have to develop models and concepts that depict what the ever changing contemporary operating environment will resemble in ten to twenty years. In doing so they will have to predict how technology and other factors will affect the capabilities of both current and emerging threats and what affect that will have on the Army's ability to defeat them.
Three broad options will become clear as this discussion develops. The first is to continue to prepare the force in its current direction. That is, continue to build and improve a counterinsurgency force with the capability to engage unconventional threats in unpredictable small wars in disparate locations. Another is to return to a force designed to engage in major combat operations or large scale industrial war. This was the force design prior to the Gulf War and was formed to defeat conventional threats in highly predictable wars against near peer rivals. The last option is to develop a force designed to engage a hybrid threat. Hybrid is a term framed by Frank G. Hoffman in his book, Conflict in the 21 st Century. It refers to a future threat that uses conventional weapons in unconventional ways and has the ability to transition from regular to irregular warfare in order to gain or maintain an advantage. 4 These options can best be described as operational approaches that address a defined problem. In order to properly arrive at the correct conclusion one must follow the four steps in the analytical process of developing these approaches, which are:
understand the strategic guidance, understand the operational environment, define the problem, and developing the approach to address the problem.
Strategic Guidance
The sources of higher level guidance used for the purpose of this paper were the Missions Review Report (QRM). All four documents give broad general guidance that U.S. forces must be flexible and adaptive in order to be capable of confronting the full range of challenges that could emerge from a complex and dynamic security environment. 5 The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) goes on to direct U.S. forces to be able to operate in six mission areas. Of those, one is most appropriate for the Army to lead in joint/coalition execution; succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations. The other five are primarily joint actions where the Army will assume a supporting role. The NDS directs U.S. forces to display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which they possess in conventional combat. 6 The NSS gives the same type directive, only in clearer language. It states that U.S. forces must maintain conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats. 7 The authors of the QDR recognized the requirement for specific 4 enablers to succeed in future conflicts. Therefore, the QDR called for military forces to be capable of working effectively with a range of civilian and international partners. 8 The QRM offers a refinement of the guidance from the previous documents.
Within it the SecDef has determined that training in irregular warfare techniques best addresses the majority of the effects of the current and future threat environment. The
Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. Those who employ irregular warfare favor indirect and asymmetric approaches. But they may also employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. 9 The primary tools used to defeat this type warfare are foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and stability operations. These activities occur across the spectrum of irregular and conventional warfare operations.
Operational Environment
In the Foreword to the U.S. Army's current rewrite of Field Manual 3-0, General William S. Wallace, the former commander of the Army Training and Doctrine
Command, described the current and future environment as, -…an era of -persistent conflict‖-a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.‖ 10 These surroundings will be heavily influenced by globalization enhanced by advanced technology. These two enablers avail all of the previously mentioned stake holders the opportunity to influence, recruit, and fight worldwide. Another critical element to mention is that many of these same stake holders will not be recognized by the international community; therefore, they will not be restrained by international law.
The National Defense Strategy characterizes the future strategic environment as a global struggle against violent extremist ideology. The actors that operate within this environment will judge costs and benefits differently than we do. They will be eager to die for their radical ideological, religious, and ethnic beliefs. These actors will ignore national borders and remain unbound by the conventions of the developed world. These characteristics will leave little room for negotiations or compromise.
11
Insurgent groups and non-state actors will seek to exploit the instability within this environment. They will pursue safe haven within the ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas that exist because of the resultant instability. 12 If not countered these insurgents and non-state actors will continue to grow and gain power.
Their efforts will be enhanced by globalization that has transformed the process of technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wide range of actors to develop and acquire advanced technologies. 13 Drastically changing world demographics will also have sweeping affects on the future strategic environment. The world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s. Ninety-five percent of that increase will occur in developing countries. The more important point is that the world's troubles will occur not only in the areas of abject poverty but also to an even greater extent, in developing countries where the combination of demographics and economy permits populations to grow, but makes meeting rising expectations difficult. Cyberspace is the final dimension of the future strategic environment that must be explored. Cyberspace allows one combatant to attack another, indirectly, from thousands of miles away and cause as much relative damage as a conventional two thousand pound bomb. In August 2010 the Pentagon released a report to the media that described cyber attacks and espionage emanating from China toward the U.S.
Some of these attacks were in the form of viruses specifically targeting defense contractors, critical industries, or government agencies. 15 It is not a far reach to conclude that with each intrusion they learn more about the vulnerabilities inherent in their opponent's defenses. At a point when the sway of national interests is strong enough and the opportunity presents itself, they could opt to execute a concentrated attack with the goal of destroying or disabling U.S. national markets or defense systems.
Relevant History. The description of the future strategic environment thus far illustrates a world of persistent conflict. In this environment U.S. forces will have to make maximum effort to deter hostile actors from threatening U.S. interests. In the event deterrence fails war will require a multilateral effort from U.S. and coalition allies. Hezbollah also launched armed unmanned aerial vehicles as part of their defense.
There is also evidence that they acquired signals intelligence equipment to monitor IDF cell phone calls and may have possibly managed to de-encrypt frequency hopping radio traffic. In this short war Hezbollah was able to illustrate the vulnerabilities of existing U.S. or Western style doctrine and operating concepts. 24 Define the Problem An analysis of the prevailing guidance and the description of the future threat environment reveal several implied/specified tasks and trends that must be addressed in any potential solution of how the future Army should be postured. These tasks and trends will form the basis for the development of capabilities required to address a future threat and establishes how the future force will operate. The tasks include but are not limited to: build partnership capacity using general purpose forces; establish forward basing and prepositioned assets; develop expeditionary mindset/capability; prepositioned assets must be tailored to meet the requirements of specific contingencies, i.e., humanitarian supplies, wheeled vehicles for ground transport, etc,.
The trends that appear within the future threat environment are perils that range from regular and irregular wars in remote lands sponsored by state and non-state actors seeking to influence established governments by creating instability; crisis zones that will require relief and reconstruction; general unrest created by population surges in developing areas, uneven distribution of wealth, and international competition over the global commons. 25 With the above tasks and trends in mind the problem statement that results should read as follows.
Adversaries with capable militaries, including access denial, information operations, advanced conventional, WMD and irregular warfare capabilities may creatively use them in new ways to coerce or attack friends or Allies, threaten regional stability, or take other actions that pose an unacceptable threat to the United States. The US military must be capable of defeating such adversaries while minimizing the prospects for unintended escalation and considering the burdens of post-war transition and reconstruction. 26 Operational Approaches
At the beginning of this paper three broad operational approaches were discussed as possible solutions to the developed problem statement. The first was to continue to prepare the force in its current direction. The second was to return to a force designed to engage in major combat operations. The last option was to develop a hybrid force designed to engage a hybrid threat.
Now that more specific information has been introduced to the discussion these broad areas can be more narrowly focused in order to better address the problem statement. Some may even be eliminated following the next stage of analysis. The next phase will start with a review of current and emerging doctrine.
The Army has developed two broad operational constructs to better define the military operations required to engage and defeat threats in the future environment.
They are wide-area security, which includes irregular warfare and combined arms maneuver which encompasses major combat operations. Wide-area security is defined as the application of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set 13 conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals. Combined arms maneuver is defined as the combination of elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantage over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success. population. 29 If this option were adopted it could cause a repeat of the U.S. initial experience following Desert Storm in Iraq.
14 The next strategy is called the division of labor. The proponents of this strategy argue that irregular and conventional warfare are markedly different modes of conflict that require distinct forces with different training, equipment and force design. They believe in placing high emphasis on deterrence, stability operations, and investing in indirect forms of security forces with a great degree of specialization in security cooperation tasks and war fighting. 30 They differ from the traditionalist thinking because they believe the U.S. should engage in small wars in order to preserve global stability.
In this way they are even more closely associated with the pre-Desert Storm Army because they adhere to the thought that Special Operations forces should focus on irregular warfare, allowing conventional forces to focus on large scale war with near peers.
Units within the division of labor strategy will have high levels of readiness due to their narrowed individual focus on the mission essential tasks required for stability type operations and conventional warfare. However, because this option produces forces that are optimized on different ends of the spectrum of war, threats in the middle such as hybrid threats, pose a significant risk. Hybrid threats would have the ability to capitalize on their lack of depth and sustainability in a protracted conflict. 31 With the spread of hybrid warfare following the success of Hezbollah against the Israeli Defense
Force the associated risk to the forces make this a less than desirable option.
As with most course-of-action development scenarios the third option is either a throw away or one that is a blend of the better of the first two. In this case author LTC Tim Watson offers a blend with his concept of rebalancing Army forces. In this strategy
Watson has taken the best of the first two options as well as input from Hoffman's -utility infielder‖ strategy to suggest a force design that has agility, addresses threat scenarios across the spectrum of conflict, and attempts to answer the mail on the tasks directed by higher guidance. In situations where hybrid forces come into play the SBCTs can be added as they are best equipped and trained for this type of enemy.
In comparison to the previous two options the rebalancing Army forces option seems to capture all of the good and addresses the bad traits of each. Rebalancing allows the Army to regain and retain combined arms maneuver skills that have atrophied over the past decade. 32 This option also provides for a deterrence capability by maintaining a lethal conventional force. Deterrence is enhanced by the availability of general purpose forces within the IBCTs that can be trained in security cooperation tasks. In doing so rebalancing forces recognizes the U.S. responsibility to assist with maintaining global stability. Last, rebalancing provides forces that have relevant capabilities that span the full spectrum of war which includes areas where hybrid forces may inject themselves. In sum, the rebalancing forces option seems to offer the Army the best capability to cover the widest range of contingencies.
Regardless of which option is selected to transition the Army to a force capable of defending against the widest range of future threats, change is required. That change, at the cultural and institutional level, will also be the greatest obstacle to the success of implementing either strategy. In order to succeed in making any major design change to the U.S. Army one must have a cursory understanding of the characteristics of some of the subcultures that make up the force.
During the Cold War period it was widely believed that any violent exchange would be between heavy armored forces with Infantry supporting to secure the flanks. Interpretation of the previous data indicates that the Army leadership must continue to adapt to meet the challenges ahead. Success appears to be in developing a force with a balanced capability to address the widest range of threats in the future environment. The Army will first have to change its cultural mind-set. There can no longer be vast distinctions between light and heavy units. Victory will come through organizations with full spectrum capability whether they ride, jump or walk into the fight.
One definite fact is that the singularly symmetric battlefield is a thing of the past. The
Army as an institution must embrace the fact that it must transform into an adaptive, understanding of what each of these JIIM partners should contribute in conflicts. 33 They bring vital enablers to the battlefield in both major combat and stability operations.
Although total change is not necessary, some reorganization is required. In his 2007 article, -Learning from Our Modern Wars,‖ General Chiarelli stated, …Because of the complexity of our current wars, some believe we should reorganize…into two types of units: those that work only at the highintensity level…and those designed…for the low intensity fight… Due to limited resources this is both unsustainable and unaffordable. As part of increasing its full spectrum capability the Army should consider increasing the number and adjusting the proportions of specialized units such as civil affairs, engineers, information operations, and others that play critical roles in stability operations. 34 The goal of this paper was to conduct an environmental scan of the operational environment in order to develop options for preparing the Army to fight and win the next war against an undefined future threat. Initial results of the scan indicated that defining a single specific threat would be impossible due to the myriad of actors involved. The better method of using the data presented was to identify trends instead. From those trends, requirements were developed which led to identification of capabilities needed to succeed in the future operational environment.
The overall conclusion was that the Army will have to develop a RESET design that will allow it to defend against the widest range of threats in the future environment.
Analysis revealed that a good enough solution is the better answer when attempting to redesign the force. That said the -rebalanced forces‖ model seemed to be the most feasible in providing the widest range of capability to address the widest range of threats. The Army must also endeavor to change its cultural mind-set in order to successfully implement any redesign. It will have to shift its culture from one that separates irregular, conventional, light, or heavy forces trained to execute a symmetrical
